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JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE.

Responding to a jury summons, free lance writer Paula DiPerna 1
found herself in a dimly lit courthouse where she was questioned, educated, and eventually excused by the court for jury service in a child
pornography trial. The experience captured her interest, and she subsequently undertook to write Juries on Trial, a personal analysis and
defense of the American jury system. Her theme is that the jury system is "an original good idea" with tremendous potential for improvement. Much more than simply her own personal story, her book
examines several common criticisms of juries, describes how the jury
system actually performs through individual case examples, and suggests measures that would improve its performance. 2 What makes this
book important is that DiPerna uses a juror's perspective and skillfully
combines jurors', judges', and attorneys' stories with trial transcripts,
reported opinions, statistical studies, and legal literature. Juries on
Trial, rather than a conclusive legal analysis, is the product of an intelligent layperson's extensive research. It is an enjoyable and thoughtful
description of the strengths and weaknesses of the jury system.
DiPerna devotes much of her book to a discussion of jury selection, a process which has received much criticism. 3 She argues that
the system selects juries that are not racially or socially representative,
and that current methods of choosing the venire panel, excusing jurors
before voir dire, and voir dire all contribute to this imbalance. After
briefly examining the theoretical and historical ,meaning of a jury of
peers as well as legal efforts to secure impartial and representative venire panels, the author describes the continued underrepresentation of
minorities in jury pools, using individual cases as examples.4 In one
1. Paula DiPema is the author of numerous articles on the environment, working women,
health, and education for the New York Times, The Nation, and Working Woman. She is a
contributing editor to The Cousteau Almanac.
2. DiPema also provides the reader with a historical understanding of the jury early in her
book. She traces the history of juries from Athenian dicastery, the huge group drawn by lot to
vote with colored stones on an accused's fate, through England's primitive trial by ordeal, to the
early American juries that vigorously exercised their right to decide the law. Pp. 21-30.
3. P. 174. See, e.g., J. vAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS (1977); see also Johnson, Black Innocence and the
White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1659 n.242, 1661-62 nn.267-69 (1985) (listing 19 recent law
review articles and notes examining racial prejudice in the use of peremptory challenges).
4. The sixth amendment guarantees a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Discrimination in venire selection may also violate the
fourteenth amendment. Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587 (1935). The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 gives federal litigants a statutory right to
juries "selected at random from a fair cross-section of the community in the district or division
wherein the court convenes" and prohibits exclusion from jury service "on account of race, color,
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town,
jury lists are culled from voter lists, which still, it is claimed, seriously
underrepresent blacks. Then, according to the town clerk, the jury list is
"revised" by jury revisers - a half-dozen local people who, going by
their personal knowledge of the community, remove the names of people
who have died or moved away, and add those they think would make
good jurors. There is nothing to prevent them from tampering with the
list, consciously or unconsciously; their meetings are secret, and they
will not talk about how they do their job.
[This] happens in other small towns still, especially in the South, but
elsewhere in the country as well, where few questions are asked about
the legality of it. 5

The second "cut," excusing jurors by request or exemption, also
skews representation by eliminating "whole categories of people" (p.
86). Some states automatically excuse .attorneys, doctors, nurses,
firefighters, pharmacists, teachers, or women with young children.
Many low income and self-employed potential jurors are excused for
economic hardship because their employers will not pay the difference
between lost wages and the average juror fee of $10 per day (pp. 8587). DiPerna supplements existing critiques6 of this long-recognized
problem with her firsthand observations and stories.
The stage at which "the idea of an impartial jury of one's peers
takes the most abuse," however, is voir dire (p. 90). Characterizing
jury selection as the manipulation of bias, DiPerna criticizes attorneys
for choosing the least offensive, least independent, and least informed
jurors. Peremptory challenge abuse, she notes, has been allowed to
continue, and "remedies remain elusive because of the knotted constitutional issues involved. . . . [B]ecause there is no effective control and
no real way to get caught, attorneys continue to flavor their peremptory challenge use with racial bias" (p. 174). All-white juries are not
only more likely to be biased against nonwhite defendants (p. 152),
they are not representative because it is hard for a white to identify
with what being black means (p. 163). In case after case, DiPerna
shows how prosecutors all over the country use peremptory challenges
to eliminate blacks and Hispanics from juries.7 Racial prejudice in
jury selection is also reflected in some judges' reluctance to excuse racially biased jurors for cause:
One white male juror - named White ... - when asked if he thought
religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-62 (1982). Most of
DiPerna's examples are state cases.
5. Pp. 83-84. The "key-man" system described here is still in use in about a third of the
states. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 708 (1984).
6. See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO JURY USE AND MANAGEMENT 131-32 (1983) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS]; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3.
7. In ·this section, and others throughout the book, DiPerna draws from personal observations and interviews which, without references, are essentially unverifiable.
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of black people as his social equals ... said, "Some of my best friends are
black." Farmer [the attorney] then asked how it was that these best
friends had never been to his house. White answered, "We're in the
South. It's a custom, I guess. It's just like a dog. I don't believe a dog
ought to be in the house." Farmer immediately moved to challenge this
man for cause on the basis of racial prejudice, but the prosecutor objected. The judge intervened: "Do you mean by that you consider a
black person as a dog?" But before White could reply, the judge rehabilitated the man's answer himself: "It means that some people believe in
house dogs, and some people don't." The juror simply affirmed. "That's
right." Thus, the defense had to spend a peremptory challenge on White
and others like him. 8

DiPerna's conclusion that systematic underrepresentation is a
widespread problem is sound. 9 She suggests no solutions, however, to
support the optimism evident in her discussion. She argues that the
standard the Court set in Swain v. Alabama 10 to measure unconstitutional systematic use of the peremptory challenge to strike blacks is
nearly impossible for a defendant to meet. DiPerna's interpretation of
Swain is shared by many. 11 She does not endorse any particular alternative to the Swain rule, however, nor does she propose one of her
own. In discussing one alternative, California's requirement that an
attorney justify her challenge at the bench when questioned by opposing counsel, DiPerna doubts how effectively it is enforced. 12 She suggests that the American public, disillusioned with the increasing time
and expense consumed by trials and opposed to more protections for
criminal defendants, would not welcome California's approach nor the
idea of reducing the number of peremptory challenges available to the
prosecutor. "Abuse of the peremptory challenge," she says, "makes
jury selection ... a political act and renders today's courtroom a wellspring of potential long- and short-term consequences, including racial
tension and violence. Its political aspect makes the peremptory issue a
hot potato" (p. 178). Although her treatment of possible peremptory
8. P. 161. On a defendant's right to question prospective jurors about racial prejudice at voir
dire, see Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986); 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 3, at
720-22.
9. See Johnson, supra note 3; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1724 (1986)
("The reality of practice, amply reflected in many state and federal court opinions, shows that the
[peremptory] challenge may be, and ... has been, used to discriminate against black jurors."),
10. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The Court explained that systematic striking of black jurors would
raise a prima facie case of discrimination under the fourteenth amendment
when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumst~nces, whatever
the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of
Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have
survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries •• , •
380 U.S. at 223. The Court has recently rejected part of Swain's holding in Batson v. Kentucky,
106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719-24 (1986).
11. See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719 n.14 (1986) (listing critiques).
12. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
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reforms is superficial compared with recent legal works on the issue, 13
her use of graphic examples and personal interviews successfully portrays the gravity of the problem.
Most of DiPema's recommendations to improve other aspects of
jury selection have some support in the legal literature (eliminating
automatic jury exemptions and encouraging more judge-conducted
voir dire, for example). 14 One change she suggests, developing a plan
of government jury service insurance to reimburse jurors for lost income, appears dubious. 15 She cites no support for this proposal and
fails to develop the idea enough to convince the reader of its viability.
Despite its occasional flaws, her treatment of jury selection is, overall,
very readable and thought-provoking.
DiPema does not believe that other criticisms of the jury system
are troublesome ones. For example, she rejects the idea that professional jury research results in injustice by "squeez[ing] out the randomness that is the keystone of the jury system" (p. 133). She
describes the successes, failures, and techniques of hired jury pickers,
drawing from the famous trials of Mark David Chapman (tried for
shooting John Lennon), Jean Harris, Sacco and Vanzetti, Angela Davis, Dr. Benjamin Spock, John Mitchell and Maurice Stans, the Pinto
case, and MCI's antitrust suit against AT&T (pp. 130-50). Although
DiPema fears that "increasingly sophisticated marketing techniques"
may make the jury of the future "highly susceptible to manipulation,"
she suggests that jurors' unpredictability will foil the efforts of prosecutors, plaintiffs, and defendants to control verdicts through jury selection (pp. 149-50).
Many complain that juries are "susceptible to being moved by factors which do not have to do with the evidence" and that such jury
misconduct is too often undiscovered (p. 218). DiPema agrees, and
recounts amazing incidents of juries that decided to create their own
evidence, including jury members who bit each other's arms to see
how long teeth marks last and a jury that determined a tight skirt in
evidence could be raised high enough for a rape to have occurred by
dressing the smallest member of the all-male jury in the skirt to test it
(pp. 218-19). DiPema's suggestion that this independence could be ad13. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 3; Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the
Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 Mo. L. REv. 337 (1982); Note, The
Defendant's Right to Object to Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 1770 (1979).
14. See, e.g., Note, Judge Conducted Voir Dire as a Time-Saving Trial Technique, 2 RUT.CAM. L.J. 161 (1970); see also 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 5, at 722 & n.23. The
American Bar Association recommends that all automatic excuses or statutory group exemptions be eliminated. See STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 61. See generally J. VAN DYKE, supra
note 3.
15. P. 225. Currently private business finances up to 68% of the cost of the jury system.
Raising juror fees to current wage levels would be a "nearly impossible burden" for many jurisdictions. See STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 131.
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equately controlled if judges "warn jurors very specifically against the
reconstruction of events" (p. 220) is hardly groundbreaking, but her
illustrations provide an amusing, yet unsettling, reminder that misconduct occurs.
The author writes glowingly of jury nullification, the historic
power of juries to refuse to follow the rules of law, still exercised
openly in some states today. 16 Her chapter entitled "Power to the
Jury?" begins with an account of the trial and jury deliberations in the
case of a young woman, charged with the murder of her father, who
claimed self-defense in response to a pattern of sexual abuse. After
interviewing the jurors months after the conviction, DiPerna concluded that "had [they] been charged that they had the right to dissent
from the law, conceivably an acquittal could have held sway" (p. 190).
She seems to agree with expert Hans Zeisel, however, that for more
states to add instructions informing jurors of their right to nullify
would be an "invitation to lawlessness" (p. 192). Infrequent and flagrant abuse of the jury's nullification power is controllable, in her
view, by clearer charges, public education, appeal, the power of the
judge to render a judgment against the verdict, and use of the special
verdict.17
She defends high jury awards in civil cases, another commonly
criticized aspect of the jury system, quoting an attorney, "It is only
when the plaintiff wins a lot of money that we hear about juries being
'hogwild.' How come 'hogwild' doesn't apply when the jury underawards?" (p. 207). To eliminate juries in civil cases, she believes,
would deny a voice to individual citizens - those most affected by
litigation in product liability, consumer fraud, medical malpractice,
environmental hazards, and other areas of law. Responding to complaints that juries in civil cases cause delay, she recognizes that bench
trials take forty percent less time than jury trials, but implies that
eliminating civil juries would not increase the efficiency of civil trials
significantly because jury cases are more "unclear" than bench cases
(p. 221). Except for this questionable suggestion, 18 DiPerna's defense
of the use of civil juries is echoed by many authorities. 19
Despite the complaints, public cynicism, and pressure to speed up
cases, DiPerna maintains that the jury system is indispensable. She
16. See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 5, at 700·02.
17. DiPerna's optimism in this regard is shared by many, but not all. See Broeder, The
Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fiction, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 412-13 (1954) (jury is inconsistent and highly unrepresentative "law-dispenser"); Van Dyke, The Jury as a Political Institutio11,
16 CATH. LAW. 224, 240-41 (1970) (jury nullification "is an important safeguard that should be
recognized and strengthened"). See generally Note, Toward Principles of Jury Equity, 83 YALE.
L.J. 1023, 1025-32 (1974).
18. DiPerna offers no support for her interpretation of the relative complexity of bench and
jury trials, and her conclusion seems far from obvious to this reader. P. 221.
19. See, e.g., Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1057-61 (1964).
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calls it the most "active hands-on civic duty" and suggests that it provides a "direct way of having a say in the proceedings of society" (p.
2). In her view, the jury is a political institution, needed to decide
important social and political issues in the courts. The capable juror
takes his or her duty to deliberate very seriously, and, she believes, is
less jaded and more attentive than most judges (p. 221). Reform is
necessary not only to minimize jury manipulation, but to ensure that
jury service is not so burdensome that potentially good jurors will try
to avoid it. She suggests using the one day/one trial technique, 20 encouraging more frequent jury service by attorneys and even judges,21
allowing jurors to take notes and ask questions, providing simpler,
written jury instructions, treating jurors courteously, and interviewing
jurors to collect needed information. Although these pleas for reform
are not novel, 22 the author's collection of illustrative cases and intelligent personal observations about the wide range of current jury issues
is impressive and unique.
The book's usefulness as a legal authority or research tool is limited by the lack of footnotes and bibliography. Despite this, DiPerna's
research seems thorough and her conclusions well-informed. She refers to several Supreme Court cases, legal periodicals, books, and studies throughout the text. She also uses interviews with prominent legal
authorities on the American jury, including Hans Zeise! and Rita Simon. 23 Juries on Trial would be helpful to anyone, especially a juror,
attorney, or student, who seeks an engaging explanation of the history
and vitality of juries and the potential for improvement of the jury
system.
-

Nancy J. King

20. The one day/one trial technique ensures that a juror will serve no longer than.the duration of one trial for which she is impaneled or one day if not impaneled. This system results in
more efficient juror usage, less inconvenience to jurors, and fewer excuses from juror duty. See
generally K. CARLSON, A. HALPER & D. WHITCOMB, ONE DAY/ONE TRIAL JURY SYSTEM
(1977); STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 55-59.
21. For one view of how a judge gained valuable insights from jury duty, see Battani, Have
You Reached A Verdict, .64 MICH. B.J. 966 (1985).
22. See generally A. CAIN & M. KRAVITZ, JURY REFORM: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
(1978); STANDARDS, supra note 6.
23. Both Simon and Zeise! are authors of several works on the jury, including R. SIMON,
THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1980); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). DiPema lists several titles and individuals in a convenient index at the end of
the book.

